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Abstract 
Poverty alleviation is an important objective of European countries and of the 
United States. If these ‘rich’ states offer elaborate systems of income 
maintenance, why is there still a considerable amount of poverty? And why are 
anti-poverty outcomes so different in the United States compared to European 
countries?  
This paper completes a trilogy of cross-country research papers on anti-poverty 
policy. Two former papers analyzed the effects of social transfers on both poverty 
levels and poverty alleviation through tax and social transfer systems. These 
papers marked the United States as an outlier: high poverty rates, low public 
social spending but high private social expenditures, a rather strong belief that 
people are poor because of laziness or lack of will, and remarkable differences 
across the Federal States caused by state discretion. Therefore, this paper 
discusses differences in anti-poverty approaches between the European Union and 
the United States. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The European Union (EU) strongly encourages member states to combat poverty, 
which is a persistent problem among states in the EU.1 The poverty problem is 
also striking in other highly developed welfare states, such as the United States. 
Industrialized countries spend a large share of their budget on income 
maintenance, but poverty has not been eradicated. A sizable proportion of the 
population lives in poverty in all industrial welfare states. According to the most 
common standards used in international poverty analyses, on average roughly one 
in ten households live in relative poverty in OECD countries.2 The persistence of 
poverty in industrial welfare states calls for an explanation. If these welfare states 
offer elaborate systems of income maintenance, why is there still a considerable 
amount of poverty? And why are antipoverty outcomes so different in the United 
States compared to those in European countries? 
 This paper is a follow-up to other papers published in Poverty & Public 
Policy in the period 2009-2011: one on U.S. Welfare Reform3 and another on 
cross-country research of antipoverty policy.4 The latter analysis reports some 
profound differences between EU15 and non-EU15 countries, with the United 
States as a special case. Additional research points to the United States as an 
outlier in several respects.5 Government policies and social spending have lesser 
effects in the United States than in any other rich nation, and both low spending 
and low wages have a great impact on the final income distribution, especially 
                                            
1  See European Commission on Poverty and Social Exclusion via 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=751; and K. Caminada and K.P. Goudswaard, 
“Effectiveness of Poverty Reduction in the EU: A Descriptive Analysis,” Poverty & Public 
Policy 1 (2) (2009), Article 5: 1-51.  
2  OECD, In It Together. Why Less Inequality Benefits All (Paris: OECD, 2015), and OECD, 
Growing Unequal? Income Distribution and Poverty in OECD Countries (Paris: OECD, 
2008). 
3  M.C. Martin and K. Caminada, “Welfare Reform in the United States: A Cross-Atlantic 
Descriptive Policy Analysis,” Poverty & Public Policy 3 (1), Article 8: 1-38. 
4  Caminada and Goudswaard, “Effectiveness of Poverty Reduction in the EU: A Descriptive 
Analysis.”  
5  T.M. Smeeding, “Public Policy, Economic Inequality, and Poverty: The United States in 
Comparative Perspective,” Social Science Quarterly 86 (supplement) (2005a): 955-983; T.M. 
Smeeding, “Poor People in Rich Nations: The United States in Comparative Perspective,” 
Luxembourg Income Study Working Paper Series #419, 2005b; T.M. Smeeding, “Poor People 
in Rich Nations: The United States in Comparative Perspective,” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 20 (1) (2006): 69-90;; and K. Caminada and K.P. Goudswaard, “How Well is 
Social Expenditure Targeted to the Poor?” in Social Security, Poverty and Social Exclusion in 
Rich and Poorer Countries, International Studies on Social Security, volume 16, eds. P. 
Saunders and R. Sainsbury (Mortsel, Belgium: Intersentia, 2010), 97-112 
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among the non-elderly.6 Smeedings’ analysis points to American institutions and 
a lack of spending effort on behalf of low-income working families. Indeed, the 
United States stands out in the relative position of those at the bottom of the 
income distribution. Moreover, Smeedings’ thorough analysis shows that 
countries with higher levels of government spending (as in Scandinavia and 
northern Europe) and more careful targeting of government transfers at the poor 
(as in Canada, Sweden, and Finland) produce lower poverty rates. Smeeding finds 
that the effects of the income package accounted for over 90 percent of the 
differences in income inequality across nations. He claims that the U.S. 
redistributive package is the prime explainer of the differences.  
 In this paper we highlight why the United States is an outlier among “rich” 
countries: high poverty rates, low public social spending but high private social 
expenditures, a rather strong belief that people are poor because of laziness or lack 
of will, and remarkable differences across the federal states due to state discretion.  
 
 
2 POVERTY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND IN THE 
UNITED STATES—IS THE UNITED STATES DIFFERENT? 
 
This section highlights some of the differences with regard to social spending and 
poverty reduction between the United States and the other OECD countries. 
Clearly, national preferences play a role in explaining the differences in social 
spending across countries, but there may be other factors as well, such as the 
structure of the labor market, the level of fractionalization (race), country size, 
and so on. In their timely study of the different approaches taken by America and 
Europe to address the problems of domestic inequality and poverty, Alesina and 
Glaeser describe just how different America and Europe are in the level of state 
engagement in the redistribution of income.7 They discuss various possible 
economic explanations for the difference, including different levels of pre-tax 
income, the openness of the economy, and social mobility. Moreover, they survey 
politico-historical differences such as the varying physical size of nations, their 
electoral and legal systems, and the character of their political parties, as well as 
their experiences of war. Finally, they examine sociological explanations which 
include different attitudes to the poor and notions of social responsibility, as well 
as, most importantly, attitudes about race. Alesina and Glaeser conclude that the 
Americans and Europeans differ in their choices regarding the welfare state and 
redistribution as a result of their different history and culture. No simple economic 
                                            
6  Smeeding, “Public Policy, Economic Inequality, and Poverty: The United States in 
Comparative Perspective,” 955. 
7  A. Alesina and E.L. Glaeser, Fighting Poverty in the US and Europe: A World of Difference 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
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theory provides a one-line answer. Instead, ethnic heterogeneity and political 
institutions seem to explain most of the differences. The importance of ethnic 
fractionalization is emphasized by Alesina and Glaeser. Compared to Europe, the 
United States is a highly heterogeneous society that is particularly distinguished 
by a disproportionate representation of visible and socially distinct minorities 
living in poverty. As such, it has always been easy for opponents of welfare to use 
racial and ethnic divisions to attack redistribution (p. 181). Estimates of Alesina 
and Glaeser show that racial fractionalization can explain approximately one-half 
of the differences in the degree of redistribution between the United States and 
Europe (p. 13).  
 
 
3 POVERTY RATES 
 
In the European Union people are said to be at risk of income poverty if their 
incomes are below 60 percent of the median disposable income of households in 
their country, after adjusting for household size (equivalence scales). For 
comparison, the official U.S. poverty line was just about 30 percent of median 
U.S. disposable post-tax household income.8 Based on the EU agreed-upon 
definition, the proportion of the European population who was at risk of poverty 
in 2013 is 17 percent (85 million people). The comparable figure for the United 
States is higher: 24 percent. 
The U.S. poverty threshold is based on an absolute poverty standard, 
which remains fixed over time in real terms. According to the U.S. definition of 
poverty, 14.5 percent of the population was living in poverty in 2013 (45 million 
people). The 2013 poverty rate was 2.0 percentage points higher than in 2007, the 
year before the most recent recession.9 The U.S. official measure of poverty is 
typically in the form of the cost of a basket of goods and services required to 
assure minimum living conditions and indexed for price changes over time. While 
the threshold is adjusted annually based on inflation using the Consumer Price 
Index (CPI-U), the measure is absolute and has been essentially unchanged since 
it was developed by Mollie Orshansky at the United States Social Security 
Administration in 1964 (National Poverty Center, University of Michigan). The 
poverty threshold estimates the rate of poverty in the United States by determining 
                                            
8  R. Haveman, R. Blank, R. Moffitt, T. Smeeding. and G. Wallace, “The war on poverty: 
measurement, trends, and policy”, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 34 (3) (2015): 
593–638. U.S. Census Bureau reports for 2013 a poverty threshold for a four-persons family 
(weighted average) of $23,834; median disposable income amounts to $51.939. 
9  C. DeNavas-Walt and B.D. Proctor, U.S. Census Bureau, “Current Population Reports, P60-
249, Income and Poverty in the United States: 2013” (Washington, DC: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 2014). 
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the number of households whose annual income is below the set threshold for the 
household’s size. The determination of poverty is made based solely on income 
and cash benefits. Non-cash benefits, such as food stamps and housing subsidies, 
are not included in the determination of a household’s poverty.  
Many countries use relative poverty measures with thresholds that are 
based on a percentage of median income. Using poverty thresholds based on 50 
percent of median income rather than the official U.S. poverty thresholds would 
increase the overall poverty. Reports on relative poverty profiles for OECD 
countries for the latest data year available consistently show, in general, that 
Scandinavian, Czech Republic and the Netherlands have the lowest poverty rates, 
followed by continental European countries. Anglo-Saxon welfare states have 
relatively higher poverty rates. Among them, the level of poverty is highest in the 
United States.10 
Using the official absolute poverty measurement from the United States 
(Orshansky poverty) alters the picture to some extent. Notten and De Neubourg 
estimate, according to the Orshansky methodology for years 1996 and 2000, that 
while the United States has a high poverty rate, it is not significantly different 
from the rate established in most European countries using the Orshansky 
measure, while Greece, Spain, and Portugal have figures four times higher than 
the United States.11 It should however be noted that their result is rather sensitive 
for the purchasing power parity rates used to convert the U.S. poverty lines to 
country-specific thresholds of EU15.  
Wang, Caminada, Goudswaard and Wang measured relative poverty rates 
for Europe as if it was a single country with an European-wide poverty line of 60 
percent instead of national thresholds.12 Their analysis consists of 20 (out of 28) 
European countries. The relative poverty rate reached 22 per cent in 2012 with an 
European-wide poverty line at 60 per cent of the median income, whereas it was 
only about 14 per cent with poverty lines equal to 60 per cent of the national 
median income. So, an Europe-wide relative poverty indicator is much higher 
                                            
10  See, for details, OECD, In It Together. Why Less Inequality Benefits All (Paris: OECD, 2015); 
Caminada and Goudswaard, “Effectiveness of Poverty Reduction in the EU: A Descriptive 
Analysis,” 1-51; K. Caminada and K.P. Goudswaard, “How Well is Social Expenditure 
Targeted to the Poor?” in Social Security, Poverty and Social Exclusion in Rich and Poorer 
Countries, International Studies on Social Security, volume 16, eds. P. Saunders and R. 
Sainsbury (Mortsel, Belgium: Intersentia, 2010), 97-112; and K. Caminada and K.P. 
Goudswaard, “Social Income Transfers and Poverty Alleviation in OECD Countries,” Leiden 
University Research Memorandum Department of Economics #2010.01.  
11  G. Notten and C. de Neuborg, “Relative or Absolute Poverty in the US and EU? The Battle of 
the Rates,” MPRA Working Paper #5313, 2007. 
12  J. Wang, K. Caminada, K. Goudswaard and C. Wang. 2015. “Decomposing income 
polarization and tax-benefit changes across 31 European countries and Europe wide, 2004-
2012”, forthcoming 
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compared to the average of national poverty rates. Moreover, figures for the 
United States (24 percent) and Europe-wide (22 percent) seem not to be 
significantly different. 
In spite of differences in the measurement of poverty, most studies have 
consistently found that there is a large difference in poverty rates between (most) 
European countries and the United States. 
 
 
4 ANTIPOVERTY POLICY 
 
Poverty alleviation has been a European objective since the Treaty of Rome in 
1957. In 2000 the European Council adopted the goal that in addition to economic 
growth, social cohesion should be strengthened in the EU (the Lisbon Agenda). 
The open method of coordination was introduced as the means of spreading best 
practices and achieving greater convergence toward the primary EU goals. Social 
indicators were developed to monitor the improvements with respect to social 
cohesion. The Europe 2020 strategy has renewed the interest in poverty 
alleviation across member states. Europe 2020 builds on lessons learned from the 
earlier strategy, but addressing its weaknesses. The meeting of European Union 
heads stated on 17 June 2010 that fighting poverty and social exclusion remains as 
one of five headline targets, with the aim to lift at least 20 million people out of 
the risk of poverty and exclusion. An multi dimensional indicator of poverty and 
social exclusion was introduced. The population is defined through three 
indicators: at risk of poverty (the current EU definition of 60% of median 
income); material deprivation (defined as persons lacking four or more – not three 
or more as in the real EU indicator – of a list of nine items) and people living in 
jobless households (meaning those aged 0-59 in households where nobody works 
or where there is low work attachment). Using these definitions, those at risk of 
poverty or social exclusion in the EU number some 120 million (24 percent of 
population). The EU target to reduce by 20 million is a reduction of 16.7%. The 
fight against poverty and social exclusion is at the heart of the Europe 2020 
strategy for inclusive growth. Today, EU countries are far from reaching the 2020 
target and the worsening social situation caused by the economic crisis is 
undermining the sustainability of social protection systems. Still a sizable 
proportion of the European population living in poverty (17 percent), although 
both poverty structure and poverty rates vary across countries from 12-14 percent 
in the Czech Republic, Denmark and the Netherlands to about 22 percent in Spain 
and Greece. Moreover, the average at-risk-of-poverty rates—an official EU social 
cohesion indicator—have risen since the adoption of the Lisbon Agenda. 
The income poverty reduction goal for the United States was officially 
declared by President Johnson in 1964: “We cannot and need not wait for the 
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gradual growth of the economy to lift this forgotten fifth of our Nation above the 
poverty line.”13 President Johnson’s 1964 State of the Union speech emphasized 
structural factors as primary causes of poverty, including “…our failure to give 
our fellow citizens a fair chance to develop their own capacities, in a lack of 
education and training, in a lack of medical care and housing, in a lack of decent 
communities in which to live… .” The prevailing view at that time was that the 
poor did not work because of excessive unemployment or, if they did work, they 
earned an insufficient amount in less-skilled jobs. In spite of the pronounced “War 
on Poverty,” income poverty was not eliminated by 1980, as planned. Even today, 
the United States is far from fulfilling the vision of the “War on Poverty” declared 
by President Johnson.14 What went wrong? Broadly speaking, most social 
scientists point at three “causes.” (1) Critics have blamed the growth of 
antipoverty programs themselves. Especially the Reagan administration which 
criticized the adverse incentives for welfare recipients to accept (low-) paid jobs. 
(2) Other critics argued that eliminating income poverty was not as important a 
goal as changing the personal behaviors of the poor. (3) Several macro-economic 
circumstances (oil shocks, the Great Recession) failed to deliver the benefits of 
economic growth among U.S. society equally. 
Haveman, Blank Moffitt, Smeeding and Wallace present a 50-year 
historical perspective of the U.S. antipoverty efforts since 1965. The initial 
reliance on cash income support to poor families has eroded; increases in public 
support came largely in the form of in-kind (e.g., Food Stamps) and tax-related 
(e.g., the Earned Income Tax Credit) benefits. Work support and the 
supplementation of earnings substituted for direct support. These shifts eroded the 
safety net for the most disadvantaged in American society. Moreover, the 
effectiveness of government antipoverty transfers is debated, although their 
findings indicate that antipoverty policies has reduced the overall level of poverty 
in the U.S.  
It should be mentioned that the European Union has emphasized the 
multidimensional nature of deprivation, and has developed supplementary 
indicators of poverty based on social indicators and the broad concept of social 
exclusion. The European Union has defined common objectives on social 
indicators—based on Atkinson et al.—to be benchmarked by the streamlined 
Open Method of Coordination.15 Both data and measurement techniques have 
                                            
13  S.H. Danziger, “Fighting Poverty Revisited: What Did Researchers Know 40 Years Ago? 
What Do We Know Today?” Focus: Institute for Research on Poverty 25 (1) (2007): 3.  
14  R. Haveman, R. Blank, R. Moffitt, T. Smeeding. and G. Wallace, “The war on poverty: 
measurement, trends, and policy”, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 34 (3) (2015): 
593–638. 
15  T. Atkinson, B. Cantillon, E. Marlier, and B. Nolan, Social Indicators. The EU and Social 
Inclusion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
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been developed in order to capture a variety of dimensions of deprivation beyond 
money income (poverty). On the contrary, the United States solely focus on the 
income dimension of poverty, although influential scientists argue that moving 
toward broader measures of poverty that take into consideration indicators of 
material deprivation and social exclusion has a number of advantages.16 
 
 
5 SOCIAL SPENDING AND ANTIPOVERTY EFFECTS 
 
Table 1 provides a picture of poverty rates and several social expenditure ratios 
for European countries and the United States. In what follows, poverty rates are 
estimated for the whole set of European countries, divided by West-EU15 
countries and CEE NMS countries. The division is asked for by different 
geography, different resource endowments, different initial conditions and 
regional social policies. These have resulted in different income levels and 
distributions across regions. Poverty rates are from the Luxembourg Income 
Study17 and from OECD.18 Three relative poverty lines are applied, and income is 
adjusted using equivalence scales. The figures show that the United States 
combines relatively high poverty rates with rather low social spending, albeit 
depending on the social spending indicator used. 
 
                                            
16  R. Haveman, “What Does It Mean to Be Poor in a Rich Society?” Institute for Research on 
Poverty Discussion Paper (Madison) #1356-08, 2008. 
17  Luxembourg Income Study, LIS Key Figures on Poverty (Luxembourg, 2015). 
18  OECD, In It Together. Why Less Inequality Benefits All (Paris: OECD, 2015). 
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Table 1: Poverty rates and social spending in European countries and in the 
United States 
 
 Poverty rate total population 
Social expenditure in % GDP, 
2011 
 LIS (around 2010) 
OECD 
(2010-2012) Gross 
public 
Gross 
public 
and 
private 
Net 
public 
and 
private   PL40 PL50 PL60 PL50 PL60 
West EU-15 4.7 8.9 15.9 9.9 16.8 26.4 28.8 24.9 
Austria 3.4 7.1 13.4 9.0 15.2 27.7 28.8 24.3 
Belgium 3.7 8.1 16.1 9.5 17.5 29.4 31.5 27.4 
Denmark 3.2 6.3 13.5 6.0 13.2 30.1 35.0 26.1 
Finland 2.8 7.2 15.0 7.5 14.7 28.3 29.5 23.4 
France 4.7 9.1 15.5 8.0 14.5 31.4 34.7 31.3 
Germany 4.6 9.5 16.4 8.7 15.0 25.5 27.5 25.3 
Greece 7.6 13.5 20.9 15.2 22.3 25.7 27.6 23.7 
Ireland 4.6 9.4 16.6 9.7 16.4 22.3 24.2 21.9 
Italy 7.5 12.5 19.1 12.6 20.0 27.5 28.3 25.4 
Luxembourg 2.8 6.1 13.1 8.1 15.6 22.5 23.4 19.1 
Netherlands 2.7 5.2 11.1 7.5 13.5 23.5 30.3 25.8 
Portugal n.a. n.a. n.a. 11.9 18.2 24.8 26.4 24.0 
Spain 9.8 15.2 22.4 15.1 21.8 26.8 27.3 24.8 
Sweden 2.6 5.6 12.0 9.7 17.4 27.2 30.0 24.6 
United Kingdom 5.3 9.8 17.4 9.5 17.0 22.7 28.0 26.1 
 
  
 
        
 
  
CEE NMS 5.2 9.3 15.5 9.4 16.1 20.3 20.7 18.4 
Czech Republic 2.9 6.3 11.3 5.9 11.5 20.1 20.3 19.3 
Estonia 7.0 11.8 19.4 11.7 20.4 16.8 16.8 14.2 
Hungary 6.2 10.4 16.8 10.4 16.9 22.6 22.8 20.6 
Poland 4.9 9.5 16.2 11.1 17.8 20.1 20.1 16.8 
Slovak Republic 4.5 8.0 13.4 8.3 14.9 18.1 18.9 17.6 
Slovenia 5.7 9.8 15.6 8.9 14.7 24.0 25.2 21.6 
 
  
 
        
 
  
United States 10.9 16.9 23.9 17.1 24.2 19.0 29.5 28.8 
 
Source: LIS (2015), OECD (2015), and SOCX OECD (2015). 
 
In all OECD countries, public cash benefits and taxes significantly reduce 
poverty. As reported by OECD, most of the redistribution toward people at the 
bottom of the income scale is generally achieved through public cash benefits—
with the main exception being the United States, where a large part of the support 
provided to low-income families is administered through the income tax system 
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(Earned Income Tax Credit, EITC).19 These cross-country differences in the scale 
of redistribution partly reflect differences in the size and structure of social 
spending. OECD countries redistribute in a variety of ways—some through 
universal benefits, others with more targeted programs, some primarily relying on 
transfers, others primarily granting tax rebates to low-income families.  
We calculate the reduction of poverty rates of market income and 
disposable income across 32 OECD countries.20 West-EU15 countries generate an 
antipoverty effect of 19.1 percentage points on average, CEE NMS countries 
show an antipoverty effect of 17.6 percentage point on average, while non-EU 
countries produce on average a lower antipoverty effect of 7.3 percentage points 
among their population; see Table 2. On the bottom of the country rankings, we 
find seven countries with an antipoverty effect of less than 9 percentage points; 
among them the United Sates.  
 
                                            
19  Ibid., 291-292. 
20  Updated figures from K. Caminada and K.P. Goudswaard, “How Well is Social Expenditure 
Targeted to the Poor?” 
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Table 2:  Targeting effect of gross total social expenditures on poverty reduction 
in 32 OECD countries, 2011 
 
 Poverty rate total population (poverty line at 60% of median income) 
Gross  total social 
spending, % GDP 
Poverty reduction 
per point GDP 
social spending   
 
Before 
taxes and 
transfers 
After taxes 
and transfers Reduction     
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (3) : (4) 
West EU-15 35.9 16.8  19.1 28.8  0.66 
Ireland 45.1 16.4 28.6 24.2 1.18 
Luxembourg 36.3 15.6 20.7 23.4 0.88 
Germany 35.9 15.0 20.9 27.5 0.76 
Portugal 37.5 18.2 19.3 26.4 0.73 
France 39.8 14.5 25.2 34.7 0.73 
Austria 36.1 15.2 20.9 28.8 0.73 
Finland 35.7 14.7 21.0 29.5 0.71 
Spain 40.5 21.8 18.7 27.3 0.68 
Greece 39.6 22.3 17.3 27.6 0.63 
United Kingdom 34.4 17.0 17.5 28.0 0.62 
Belgium 35.6 17.5 18.1 31.5 0.57 
Italy 35.8 20.0 15.8 28.3 0.56 
Netherlands 29.5 13.5 16.0 30.3 0.53 
Sweden 29.7 17.4 12.3 30.0 0.41 
Denmark 27.4 13.2 14.2 35.0 0.40 
 
         CEE NMS 33.5 15.9 17.6  20.3  0.87  
Czech Republic 33.1 11.5 21.5 20.3 1.06 
Slovak Republic 32.8 14.9 17.8 18.9 0.94 
Estonia 35.7 20.4 15.3 16.8 0.91 
Slovenia 33.6 14.7 18.9 25.2 0.75 
Poland 32.3 17.8 14.5 20.1 0.72 
 
         Non-EU 28.3  20.9 7.3  18.2  0.40  
Mexico 33.2 27.6 5.7 7.9 0.72 
Norway 29.3 13.3 16.0 22.7 0.70 
Iceland 24.9 10.2 14.7 22.7 0.65 
Canada 29.6 19.0 10.5 22.0 0.48 
Australia 30.5 21.2 9.3 20.7 0.45 
New Zealand 28.2 18.8 9.4 21.2 0.44 
Chile 28.8 24.8 4.0 11.4 0.35 
Israel 33.2 27.8 5.4 17.7 0.31 
United States 33.0 24.2 8.8 29.5 0.30 
Switzerland 18.6 16.3 2.3 20.3 0.11 
Korea 22.1 20.9 1.1 10.5 0.11 
Turkey 28.1 27.1 1.0 12.2 0.08 
Mean OECD-32 32.7 18.2 14.5 18.2 0.61 
 
Source: OECD (2015), SOCX OECD (2015), and own calculations 
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Each percentage point of gross total social expenditure alleviates poverty 
in European countries  by 0.7 percentage points on average. A much lower score 
is found for the United States (0.30). The targeted effectiveness of the United 
States is remarkably low, and lies below half of the average of all countries. Two 
specific factors seem to be of importance. First, a poverty threshold of 60 percent 
of median income is applied, while U.S. social policies target lower levels of 
income to lift people out of poverty. Second, the United States devotes the 
smallest share of its resources to public antipoverty income transfer programs 
across the countries examined.21 However, when private social expenditures are 
also taken into account, this picture changes. In that case, the United States ranks 
sixth when all 32 countries are ordered on the basis of their level of total social 
expenditures. Therefore, public versus private social expenditures may have 
opposite antipoverty effects.22 In any case, the large cross-country differences in 
the antipoverty effect of social transfers and taxes—with exceptionally low scores 
for the United States—call for further investigation. 
Between 1975, the first year the EITC existed, and 2012, total spending on 
all means-tested cash and in-kind transfers rose from 1 percent to 4 percent of 
GDP.23 However, in 2012, 40 percent of that spending was dedicated to Medicaid. 
This is important because while the growth in spending for health care programs 
(primarily Medicaid) stemmed from greater spending per participant, growth in 
spending for other means-tested programs resulted primarily from increases in the 
number of participants due to changing economic conditions – most significantly 
the recession that occurred between 2007 and 2009 and the slow recovery that 
followed. In other words, the U.S. has not made significantly greater investments 
in anti-poverty programs, there has however, been an increase in need.  
Why has U.S. antipoverty spending been low and relatively stable given 
its persistent and high poverty rates? The contrast in levels in social expenditures 
between the United States and other OECD countries is striking. Smeeding 
calculates a consistent set of social expenditures (including cash, near-cash, and 
housing expenditures) as a percentage of GDP for five groups of countries—
Scandinavia; Northern Continental Europe; Central and Southern Europe; 
“Anglo” (Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom); and the United States—
between 1980 and 1999.24 Spending ranges between 2.7 and 3.6 percent of GDP 
                                            
21  Smeeding, “Public Policy, Economic Inequality, and Poverty: The United States in 
Comparative Perspective.” 
22  K. Caminada and K.P. Goudswaard, “Are Public and Private Social Expenditures 
Complementary?” International Advances in Economic Research 11 (2) (2005): 175-189. 
23  Martin and Caminada, “Welfare Reform in the United States: A Cross-Atlantic Descriptive 
Policy Analysis”. 
24  T.M. Smeeding, “Poverty, Work, and Policy: The United States in Comparative Perspective,” 
in Social Stratification: Class, Race, and Gender in Sociological Perspective, ed. David 
Grusky. Third Edition. (Westview Press, 2008), 327-329. 
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in the United States, a far lower level than every other country group. The other 
Anglo countries averaged between 4.8 and 7.8 percent of GDP, similar to the 
Central and Southern European countries. Northern Europe and the Scandinavian 
countries averaged between 8.1 and 15.3 percent of GDP. The trends across 
country groups vary, though most country groups increased expenditures as a 
share of GDP between 1980 and 1999. The United States did not. 
 
 
6  THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL EXPENDITURES FOR 
HEALTH PROGRAMS 
 
Quantitative studies have found a strong negative relationship between poverty 
rates and the level of social expenditure over the last 25 years (see Caminada and 
Goudswaard 2010b for a review). In other words, countries with a higher level of 
welfare expenditure are likely to have lower poverty rates. However, cross-
national comparison of social spending is rather sensitive with respect to 
expenditures related to healthcare programs, especially when (west) European 
countries and non-EU15 countries are evaluated. For example, among all 
countries the United States spends the most on health programs (47 percent of 
public and private social expenditure), while figures for Europe are much lower, 
ranging from 20 percent in Denmark to 33 percent in Germany (European average 
is 26 percent); see Figure 1.  
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Figure 1: Composition of gross social expenditure, 2011  
 
Source: SOCX OECD (2008) and own calculations. 
 
One could argue either way: health expenditures generally do not qualify as 
income transfers; at the same time health programs are an important element of 
the safety net in most countries, probably generating large antipoverty effects 
through benefits in-kind and taxes (contributions). We undertake a pragmatic 
approach, because including or neglecting health expenditure will affect our 
empirical analysis on the relationship between poverty rates and social spending 
across countries to a large extent. We employ a sensitive analysis for social 
spending other than for health programs as well; see Figure 2.  
We analyze the relationship between gross total social expenditure (including and 
excluding social expenditures for heath programs) and relative income poverty. A 
vast literature claims that high social effort goes along with low poverty levels 
across countries. Social expenditure ratios are generally used as a proxy for social 
effort. We find quite a strong negative relationship between the level of gross total 
social expenditure and relative poverty across 34 OECD countries, but the linkage 
between social effort and poverty levels is much weaker (insignificant) across 
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European countries, while the linkage is significant across non-EU countries. 
Thus, the familiar claim must be toned down.25 
Moreover, for West-EU15 countries the treatment of health expenditures does not 
alter the result much, independent of the relative poverty line applied (50 or 60 
percent of median income). However, excluding health expenditures generates 
considerable better fits (higher adjusted R2) for non-EU countries, especially 
because the United States is an outlier with relatively high social expenditures for 
(private) health programs.  
 
Figure 2: Linkage between gross total social expenditure (excluding health) and 
OECD poverty rates across 34 countries, 2011 
 
West-EU15 (Poverty line 50% median income) 
 
West-EU15 (Poverty line 60% median income) 
 
CEE NMS (Poverty line 50% median income) 
 
CEE NMS (Poverty line 60% median income) 
 
                                            
25  See K. Caminada, K. and K. Goudswaard, “The relationship between alternative measures 
of social spending and poverty rates”, International Review of Business and Social Sciences 
1 (5) (2012): 1-16. 
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Non-EU (Poverty line 50% median income) 
 
Non-EU (Poverty line 650% median income) 
 
 
OECD 34 (Poverty line 50% median income) 
 
OECD 34  (Poverty line 60% median income) 
 
 
Regression analysis for OECD poverty rates (around 2011) and gross total social spending 2011. 
Dependent variable: OECD poverty rate (poverty line 50 or 60 percent of median income). N = 34. 
Simple OLS-regression; standardized regression coefficients are reported; p-values in parentheses. 
Adj R2 refers to the adjusted correlation coefficient. 
Selected countries: (1) West-EU15 countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the 
United Kingdom; (2) CEE NMS countries: Czech Republic,  Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovak 
Republic,  and Slovenia; (3) Non-EU countries: Australia, Canada, Chili, Iceland, Israel, Japan, 
Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United States  
 
 
 
 
Source: OECD (2015), SOCX OECD (2015), and own calculations. 
 
 
7 NATIONAL PREFERENCES FOR SOCIAL SPENDING 
 
National preferences for social protection differ substantially across countries. 
Anglo-Saxon countries do not seem to be prepared to sustain the high protection 
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levels prevailing in other countries with the same levels of income. Swabish et al. 
assembled data to examine the cross-national effects of income inequality and 
trust on social expenditures.26 Their results suggest that as the “rich” become 
more distant from the middle and lower classes, they find it easier to opt out of 
public programs and to buy substitutes for social insurance in the private market. 
These cultural differences within the group of OECD countries could point to 
variance in the antipoverty nature of social systems as well. Anglo-Saxon welfare 
states (especially the United States) rely more heavily on private social 
arrangements in regard to pensions, healthcare, and other programs.27 However, 
private social programs may generate a more limited redistribution of resources 
than public ones, and tax advantages toward private pension and health plans are 
more likely to benefit the rich. Moreover, the burden of poverty on individuals 
and families depends not just on its size but also on how others in society view its 
nature, in particular whether poverty is perceived as the result of individual 
attitudes or of the way society is organized.28 Figure 3 shows the share of 
respondents who believe that people are poor because of laziness or lack of will, 
on one side, or because society is unfair, on the other. In general, the share of 
respondents who believe that poverty reflects laziness is greater in the United 
States than in the Nordic and Continental European countries.29  
 
                                            
26  J. Swabish, T.M. Smeeding, and L. Osberg, “Income Distribution and Social Expenditures: A 
Cross National Perspective,” in The Distributional Effects of Government Spending and 
Taxation, ed. D.B. Papadimitriou (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2006), 247-
288. 
27  D.A. Super, “Privatization, Policy Paralysis, and the Poor,” California Law Review 96 (393) 
(2008): 393-469. 
28  OECD, Growing Unequal? Income Distribution and Poverty in OECD Countries, 131. 
29  For more details on why Americans hate welfare, see the thorough analysis of M. Gilens, Why 
Americans Hate Welfare: Race, Media, and the Politics of Antipoverty Policy (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1999). Gilens reviews survey data to suggest that Americans 
supported the welfare retrenchment of 1996 based on the mistaken assumption that most 
welfare recipients were not trying to achieve personal responsibility in regard to work and 
family. Moreover, Gilens’s work punctures myths and misconceptions about welfare policy, 
public opinion, and the role of the media in both. The public’s views on welfare seem to be a 
complex mixture of cynicism and compassion; misinformed and racially charged, they 
nevertheless reflect both a distrust of welfare recipients and a desire to do more to help the 
“deserving” poor.  
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Figure 3: Subjective attitudes to poverty—share of respondents attributing poverty 
to different reasons 
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Source: OECD (2008, 131). 
 
 
 
8 POLICY COORDINATION MECHANISM TO COMBAT 
POVERTY 
 
In December 2000, the Nice European Council launched the open method of 
coordination on social inclusion (soft law). This governance methodology was 
modeled on the treaty-based European Employment Strategy and includes 
agreement on common EU objectives and (income poverty) indicators, the 
adoption of National Action Plans on Inclusion, and periodic monitoring and peer 
review. It should be noted that “coordination” is a mercurial term in the context of 
OMC; however, policy competence remains with the member states.30 Key 
actions asked for by the European Commission consist of (a) monitoring of EU 
countries' economic and structural reforms through the European Semester, and 
(b) all EU member countries have to translate the Europe 2020 targets into 
national targets. These individual efforts need to be coordinated to achieve the 
desired effect on better social cohesion (less poverty). 
                                            
30  K.A. Armstrong, “The ‘Europeanisation’ of Social Exclusion: British Adaption to EU Co-
ordination,” British Journal of Politics & International Relations 8 (1) (2006): 79-100. 
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In the United States, responsibility for antipoverty policy has shifted since 
1996 from the antipoverty agencies of the federal government to the individual 
U.S. states and to the tax code (EITC). The Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 provides block grants to states with few 
restrictions. States were required to spend at least 75 percent of their previous 
level of welfare spending, and states had to meet targets for moving recipients into 
work activities. Thus, the European Union employs “soft law” as a policy 
coordination mechanism, while in the United States “hard law” is applied. 
Furthermore, while the majority of welfare funding is provided by the federal 
government in the United States, an above-state budget for poverty alleviation is 
lacking in Europe, based on the principle of subsidiarity. Finally, policy actions  
for reducing poverty rates are rather vague and do not aspire to a specified target 
on either side of the Atlantic. For example, the Europe 2020 poverty target acts 
only as an incentive for developing a stronger focus on social issues, because lack 
of policy responses by EU countries can not be enforced by the European 
Commission.  
 
 
9 CONCLUSION 
 
Poverty alleviation is an important objective of European countries and of the 
United States. However, while these wealthy states have highlighted poverty as a 
serious problem, and while they have established varied systems in an attempt to 
address it, significant poverty remains. While poverty is witnessed in both the 
United States and Europe, the United States remains an outlier; with high poverty 
rates and low social spending. The difference between the U.S. and Europe is both 
policy-based and ideological. Throughout this paper we have attempted to offer a 
primer in the differences between poverty definitions and the subsequent poverty 
rates, and antipoverty policies in the United States and Europe.  
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